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We explore the role of technological innovation as a source of economic growth by constructing direct
measures of innovation at the firm level. We combine patent data for US firms from 1926 to 2010
with the stock market response to news about patents to assess the economic importance of each innovation.
Our innovation measure predicts productivity and output at the firm, industry and aggregate level.
Furthermore, capital and labor flow away from non-innovating firms towards innovating firms within
an industry. There exists a similar, though weaker, pattern across industries. Cross-industry differences
in technological innovation are strongly related to subsequent differences in industry output growth.
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nstoffma@indiana.eduEconomists since Schumpeter have argued that technological innovation, combined with resource
reallocation, is the engine that sustains long-term economic growth. However, the impact of technical
change on economic growth and business cycle uctuations remains dicult to quantify. Similarly,
while technology shocks play a central role in macroeconomic real business cycle models, there
is little consensus on whether these shocks represent actual technological improvements, or are
reduced-form representations of other economic forces.1 The primary reason for these ambiguities is
the diculty in measuring technological innovation in the data. This paper aims to ll this gap.
We construct a novel economic measure of innovation that combines information from patent
dataset with stock market data over the period 1926 to 2010.2 Measuring technological innovation
through patents oers important advantages. Patents are a direct measure of innovation that
are available as far back as the eighteenth century. However, the use of patents as a measure of
innovation has one important shortcoming: not all patents are of equal economic value. Thus, an
increase in the number of patents granted need not coincide with greater technological innovation.
Our central idea is to use the stock market reaction around the day the patent is granted to
appropriately weigh each patent. On the day that the patent is granted, market participants learn
the full details of the patent. We use this stock market reaction as a measure of patent quality to
construct measures of innovation at the rm, industry and economy level which allows us to evaluate
the reallocation and growth dynamics within and across industries after bursts of innovative activity.
Our approach to measuring the quality of patents oers distinct advantages over the existing
measures of patent quality. Patent citations contain useful information that can be used to assess the
quality of patents.3 However, patent citations suer from two major drawbacks. First, measuring
future citations each patent generates requires information over the entire sample. In many economic
applications { such as when exploring the short and medium run response of investment or hiring
decisions to innovation { it may be more desirable to use a measure that depends on the contemporary
assessment of the value of a patent, as is the case with our measure. Second, the patent citation
data is reliably available only in the later part of our sample.4 This lack of information creates
problems in assessing the quality of earlier patents, since patents often tend to cite only the most
1See, for instance, Cochrane (1994).
2Several new studies exploit the same source of patent data (Google Patents) as we do in our paper. For instance,
see Moser and Voena (2011), Moser, Voena, and Waldinger (2012) and Lampe and Moser (2011).
3See, for example, Harho, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel (1999), Hall, Jae, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Moser,
Ohmstedt, and Rhode (2011).
4Moser and Nicholas (2004) and Nicholas (2008) discuss the diculty in reliably extracting citations data from
patent documents before 1975. Also note that 1947 is the rst year citations were ocially included on patent
documents.
1recent ones.5 In contrast, our measure is reliably available over a long time period allowing us
to make meaningful comparisons. Despite these two drawbacks, patent citations do provide an
independent measure of the ex-post value of a patent. Thus, we use patent citations as a validation
of our procedure. We nd that the rm's stock market reaction when the patent is granted is a
strong predictor of the number of citations the patent receives in the future.
Our measure of technological innovation captures known periods of high technological progress as
well as rms driving these waves (e.g., technologically progressive 1960s and early 1970s, see Laitner
and Stolyarov (2003)). In addition, the empirical distribution of rm-level innovation measure is
extremely fat-tailed, since a few large rms contribute disproportionately to the aggregate rate of
innovation in the economy. The identity of these rms varies by decade. This nding is consistent
with past research which describes the nature of radical innovations (Harho, Scherer, and Vopel
(1997)). Furthermore, we nd that characteristics of innovating rms using our measure match
those of innovators as described by Baumol (2002), Griliches (1990) and Scherer (1983).
Armed with our measure, we examine the relation between innovation and economic growth.
First, we explore the link between rm productivity and innovation. Our innovation measure is
strongly linked to productivity of capital and labor, both at the rm and at the industry level.
Firms and industries that innovate experience a surge in productivity. The innovation activity of
competing rms has a negative eect on rm productivity, but only in the short run. The long run
response of rm productivity to the innovation activity of other rms in the industry is either zero
or positive.
We nd several patterns in the data that are consistent with Schumpeter's notion of \creative
destruction". Capital and labor are reallocated towards rms that innovate, away from rms that do
not. We nd similar patterns of reallocation across industries. An increase in the innovation activity
of other industries is associated with an increase in the cost of labor, resulting in an outow of
labor if the industry innovates less. The corresponding patterns for capital are similar, but weaker,
consistent with the view that labor has lower specicity than capital (Ramey and Shapiro, 2001).
In addition, we nd that an increase in industry innovation is also associated with an increase in
the rate of rm exit.
Our nal step is to relate aggregate growth to innovation. To do so, we estimate the impulse
response of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) and output to our aggregate innovation
measures. Our innovation measure accounts for a substantial fraction of movements in aggregate
5For instance, the telephone patent by Alexander Graham Bell (patent number 174,465) has only one citation in
the Google Patent database.
2TFP. An increase in innovation is associated with an increase in aggregate output, although with a
lag of three to four years. We nd similar patterns in the cross-section. Dierences in innovation
are strongly related to dierences in subsequent growth both at the industry and rm level. These
ndings make a strong case for innovation as a source of long-run rm growth, consistent with the
equilibrium model of Klette and Kortum (2004).
Our paper is connected to several strands of the literature. Our work is closely related to the
literature in macroeconomics that tries to measure technological innovation. Broadly, there are three
three main approaches to identify technology shocks. First, researchers have measured technological
change through Solow residuals, after accounting for non-technological eects such as imperfect
competition and varying utilization (e.g., Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)). Second, researchers
have imposed long-run restrictions on vector auto-regressions (VARs) to identify technology shocks.
Both of these approaches measure technology indirectly. The resulting technology series are highly
model-dependent, as they depend on the identication assumptions.
Our approach falls into the third category, which constructs direct measures of technological
innovation using micro data. Shea (1999) constructs direct measures of technology innovation using
patents and R&D spending and nds a weak relationship between TFP and technology shocks.
Our contrasting results suggest that this weak link is likely the result of assuming that all patents
are of equal value. Indeed, Kortum and Lerner (1998) show that there is wide heterogeneity in
the economic value of patents. Furthermore, uctuations in the number of patents granted are
often the result of changes in patent regulation, or the quantity of resources available to the US
patent oce (see e.g. Griliches (1990) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001)). As a result, a larger number
of patents does not necessarily imply greater technological innovation. Using R&D spending to
measure innovation overcomes some of these issues, but doing so measures innovation indirectly.
The link between inputs and output may vary as the eciency of the research sector varies over
time or due to other economic forces.6 The measure proposed by Alexopoulos (2011) based on
books published in the eld of technology overcomes many of these shortcomings. However, this
measure is only available at the aggregate level, and does not directly capture the economic value
of innovation. In contrast, our measure is available at the rm level, which allows us to evaluate
reallocation and growth dynamics across rms and sectors.
Our paper is not the rst to link rm patenting activity and stock market value (Pakes, 1985;
Austin, 1993; Hall et al., 2005; Nicholas, 2008). In particular, Pakes (1985) examines the relation
6Kortum (1993) documents that the patent-to-R&D ratio has shown a secular decline in the US.
3between patents and the stock market rate of return in a sample of 120 rms during 1968{1975. His
estimates imply that, on average, an unexpected arrival of one patent is associated with an increase
in the rm's market value of $810,000. The ultimate objective of these papers is to measure the
economic value of patents; in contrast, we use the stock market reaction as a means to an end|to
construct appropriate weights for an innovation measure which we employ to study reallocation and
growth dynamics.
Our paper is also related to work that examines whether technological innovation leads to
positive knowledge spillovers or business stealing. Closest to our paper is the work of Bloom,
Schankerman, and Reenen (2010), who disentangle the externalities generated by R&D expenditures
on rms competing in the product and technology space. We contribute to this literature by
proposing a measure of patent quality based on stock market reaction and assessing within- as well
as between-industry reallocation and growth dynamics after bursts of innovative activity.
Our work is also related to literature on endogenous growth and creative destruction (see
Acemoglu (2009) for a textbook treatment). Closest to our work are the papers that explore the
impact of innovation on rm productivity and growth (Caballero and Jae, 1993; Akcigit and Kerr,
2010; Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and William, 2011). Finally, our paper is also related to work that
explores the micro-foundations of aggregate economic shocks. In particular, Gabaix (2011) proposes
that if the distribution of rm size is suciently fat-tailed, as is the case in the US and in most
of the world, rm-specic shocks can have substantial eects on aggregate quantities due to the
failure of the law of large numbers. Consistent with this view, the empirical distribution of rm-level
innovation measure is fat-tailed, suggesting that the innovative activity of a few large rms can have
a large aggregate impact. However, we nd evidence of comovement of our innovation measures
across rms, suggesting that common shocks play an important role as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the process of
constructing our dataset. We describe the constriction of our innovation measure in Section 3.
Section 4 studies the response of individual rms and industries on our innovation measure and
documents patterns of reallocation. Section 5 explores the response of aggregate variables on our
innovation measure. Section 6 discusses the connection of our ndings with existing models and
concludes.
42 Data
Our measure of innovation relies on using information on patents that a rm creates and the stock
market response to news about these patents. We now discuss our data pertaining to patents and
stock market reaction. We also elaborate on other data that we employ in our analysis.
2.1 Patent Data
Patents in the United States are granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Oce
(USPTO). We download the entire history of U.S. patent documents from Google Patents.7 Each of
about 7.8 million patent les was downloaded using an automation script.8
To construct our measure of innovation, we match all patents in the Google data to corporations
whose returns are in the CRSP database. Patent regulations require that only an individual, not a
corporation, can be an inventor. However, the inventor can assign the granted property rights to a
corporation or another person. Therefore, when patents are granted they always have an inventor,
and sometimes an \assignee" (one or more corporations or people).
For most patents, Google provides a text version of the patent document, which they created
using OCR software. We use this text version of the document to extract the names of corporations
to which patents are assigned. However, OCR technology is imperfect, and many of the downloaded
documents include a great deal of garbled text. We therefore make use of a number of text analysis
algorithms to extract relevant information from the documents.
Our sample covers patents granted between 1926 and 2010 matched to rms with returns in
CRSP database. Since we merge our patent data with data on stock returns, we are limited to the
period after 1926, when the CRSP database begins.
Matching patents to rms
Here, we briey discuss the steps our matching procedure followed, but provide extensive detail in
the Online Appendix. We search the document for the words \assignee" or \assigned" and extract
the text that immediately follows. This text is either a company name, or the name of an individual
to whom the patent was assigned. We then count the number of times each assignee name appears
7http://www.google.com/patents
8Google also makes available for downloading bulk patent data les from the USPTO. The bulk data does not have
all of the additional \meta" information including classication codes and citation information that Google includes in
the individual patent les. Moreover, the quality of the text generated from Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
procedures implemented by Google is better in the individual les than in the bulk les provided by the USPTO. As
explained below, this is crucial for identifying patent assignees.
5across all patent documents. We compare each assignee name to more common names, and if a
given name is \close" (in the sense of the Levenshtein distance9) to a much more common name,
we substitute the common name for the uncommon name. For example, one of the most common
names is \General Electric Company", which is associated with over 43,000 patents. We substitute
this name for the far less common, but quite similar, names \General Electbic Oohpany", \General
Electbic Cqhpany", and \Genebal Electbic Compakt".
At this point, we have an assignee name for each patent. These names must be matched to
a company identier such as the CRSP permco. This is accomplished in two steps. We begin by
looking only at patents that are also in the NBER database. For each assignee name identied
in the steps above, we count how many dierent permcos are matched to patents in the NBER
database. For example, all of the patents with an assignee name \General Electric Company" are
matched to one permco in the NBER database. We can therefore safely assume that all of the
patents assigned to the General Electric Company can be matched to that permco, even for patents
not included in the NBER data. Remaining assignee names are matched to CRSP rm names using
a name matching algorithm.10 The algorithm uses a score based on the inverse word frequency
to match assignee names to possible company names. For example, the word \American" is quite
common in company names, and so contributes little to name matching; the word \Bausch" is quite
uncommon, so it is given much more weight. Visual inspection of the matched names conrms very
few mistakes in the matching.
Extracting patent citations
We extract patent citations from three sources. First, all citations for patents granted between 1976
and 2011 are contained in text les available for bulk downloading from Google. These citations
are simple to extract and likely to be free of errors, as they are ocial USPTO data. Second, for
patents granted before 1976, we extract citations from the OCR text generated from the patent les.
We search the text of each patent for any 6- or 7-digit numbers, which could be patent numbers.
We then check if these potential patent numbers are followed closely by the corresponding grant
date for that patent; if the correct date appears, then we can be certain that we have identied
a patent citation. Since we require the date to appear near any potential patent number, it is
unlikely that we would incorrectly record a patent citation { it is far more likely that we would
9The Levenshtein distance is the number of edits required to make one string match another string, where an edit
is inserting, deleting, or substituting one character.
10The algorithm is based on code written by Jim Bessen, available at http://goo.gl/m4AdZ.
6fail to record a citation than record one that isn't there. Third, we complement our citation data
with the hand-collected reference data of Nicholas (2008). See the online appendix for a detailed
explanation of this process.
Summary statistics
We now provide some statistics that lend credence to our method for extracting patent information.
Table 1 shows how many patents we match to companies. Of the 6.0 million patents granted in or
after 1926, we nd the presence of an assignee in 2.8 million. The matching procedure provides us
with a database of 1.8 million matched patents, of which 435,814 (24%) are not included in the
NBER data. Figure 1 graphs the total number of patents matched by the year the patent was
granted. Patents included in the NBER data, which is the most comprehensive database previously
available, are shown in light shading. Patents unique to our database are presented in dark shading.
Note that the two sets of data appear to t together fairly smoothly, and that even during the
period covered by the NBER data, our database adds an average of 2,187 patents to the NBER
data.11
Table 2 provides additional summary statistics. Overall, our data provides a matched permco
for 66% of all patents with an assignee, or 31% of all granted patents. By comparison, the NBER
patent project provides a match for 32% of all patents from 1976{2006, so our matching technique
works quite well, even using only data extracted from OCR documents for the period before the
NBER data. Another point of comparison is Nicholas (2008), who uses hand-collected patent data
covering 1910 to 1939. From 1926{1929, he matches 9,707 patents, while our database includes
8,858 patents; from 1930{1939 he has 32,778 patents while our database includes 47,039 matches
during this period.
2.2 Stock Market and Financial Data
The return data used to assess the stock market response to news about patents are from CRSP
over the period 1926{2010. In several of our analyses we use nancial and accounting data that
are from Compustat. The sample in these cases is determined by the availability of Compustat
data (available from 1951 onwards). As is standard, we omit nancial rms and utilities from our
analysis. See appendix A for variable denitions.
11We use information on the patent-assignee match in the NBER data to assist with our matching, so the match
during the overlapping period is generally the same, by construction. An exception is for cases where there is apparently
a mistake in the NBER match and our patent-assignee frequency-based matching system corrects an error.
73 Measuring innovation
In this section we explain how we construct our rm, industry and aggregate level measures of
innovation. Our innovation in this paper is to identify the value of a patent from the stock price
reaction around the days that the market learns that a rm has applied for a specic patent, or
that a patent has been granted to the rm.
In order to examine stock market reactions, we need to dene what constitutes an information
event. Prior to 2000, patent application lings were not publicized (see e.g. Austin (1993)). In
contrast, information does become widely available when patents are granted. The USPTO's
publication, Ocial Gazette, which is published every Tuesday, lists patents that are granted that
day and reports details of the patent. Subsequent to the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,
the USPTO also began publishing applications 18 months after ling even if the patents had not yet
been granted. Publication of these applications occurs on Thursday of each week. When application
publication dates are available, we combine the stock market reaction around both information
events to construct our innovation measure.
When constructing our innovation measure, we only use information on patents by publicly-
traded rms. Hence, one worry is that we do not include private companies, several of which might
be responsible for large and more important productivity shocks.12 This omission is likely to bias
our ndings toward zero. The magnitude of any bias, however, is likely to be small. First, Bloom
et al. (2010) show that public rms in Compustat account for most of the R&D expenditures in the
United States. Second, Baumol (2002) notes that while several independent and private rms might
provide initial innovation, large publicly traded rms conduct most of the renements that lead to
large improvements in welfare.
We should stress that while our method identies the value of a patent, relying on stock market
reaction suers from two limitations. First, market participants may have advance knowledge of
the patent, either through information leakages, or because the rm has chosen to make its patent
application public. If so, the stock market reaction on the patent grant day or publication date
would underestimate the economic value of the patent. Second, our method only allows us to
measure the private value of the patent. In contrast, the social value of a patent can be higher, or
lower, depending on whether the patent generates research spillovers or steals business from existing
rms. Notably, the challenge of accurately measuring the private and social value of an innovation
12Kortum and Lerner (2000) nd that venture capital, which accounts for 3% of total R%D expenditures, is
responsible of 15% of industrial innovations.
8is not unique to our paper, but confronts other measures, such as R&D or patent citation counts, as
well.
3.1 Extracting patent value from stock price reaction
We extract information about the value of each patent from stock price reactions using two methods:
a simple measure that ignores measurement error, and a more sophisticated measure that incorporates
the error into the estimation procedure.
A simple measure
To isolate market movements we focus on the rm's idiosyncratic return, rft, dened as the rm's
return minus the return on the market portfolio. By using this `market-adjusted-return model'
(Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997), we avoid the need to estimate the rm's stock market beta,
therefore removing one source of measurement error. As a robustness check, we construct the
idiosyncratic return as the rm's stock return minus the return on the beta-matched portfolio
(CRSP: bxret). This has the advantage that it relaxes the assumption that all rms have the same
amount of systematic risk, but is only available for a smaller sample of rms. Unless noted otherwise,
our results are quantitatively similar when using this alternative denition.
Given our measure of idiosyncratic rm return, we construct the idiosyncratic stock price
reaction as the rm's idiosyncratic return during the announcement window, rl
jd, times the market







The next step is to choose the length of the announcement window, l. As we show below, trading
volume is higher on the two days following a patent being granted, suggesting that the stock price
movements in days after the announcement are also informative. The downside is that increasing
the announcement window can potentially add noise to our estimates. In the baseline case, we
choose a three-day window (l = 2). As a robustness test, we extend the window to ve days (l = 4).
The private value of a patent is generally nonnegative because a rm can always choose not to
implement it. Therefore, when we construct our innovation measure, we restrict attention only to
positive stock price responses:
A+
j = max[Aj;0]: (2)
9Our rst measure of innovation A+
j is easy to construct, since it involves no estimation of
parameters. The downside, however, is that it ignores the possibility of measurement errors. In
particular, by truncating returns at zero we are introducing an upward bias in our estimate of the
dollar value of innovation. The magnitude of this bias is increasing in the volatility of the rm's
idiosyncratic return. To ensure that the variation in our measure A+
j does not result from variation
in the rm volatility, we control for idiosyncratic volatility ft throughout.
Adjusting for measurement error
We construct an alternative measure of innovation to explicitly account for measurement error
introduced while constructing the simple measure.13 In other words, we account for that fact that
the stock price of innovating rms may uctuate for reasons unrelated to innovation during the
announcement window. The idiosyncratic stock return during the announcement day window can
be decomposed as:
rl
jd = xj + ejdl; (3)
where x denotes the value of the patent (as percentage of market value) and edl the component of
rm stock return that is unrelated to the patent. Under the assumption that ejdl  N(0;j) and x
is distributed according to a Gaussian N(0;vj) truncated at zero, we can construct the conditional
expectation of the value of the patent as a function of the rm's stock return:
E[xjjrl


















In order to operationalize our procedure, we need estimates of vj and j, preferably at the rm
level. To reduce the number of parameters, we assume that j = , that is, the signal-to-noise
ratio is constant across rms and time. To estimate , we regress log squared returns on a patent






= a0 + aft + bd + Ifd + ufd; (6)
13We are grateful to John Cochrane for this suggestion.
10controlling for rm-year (aft) and day-of-the-week (bd) xed eects. The signal-to-noise estimate is
then:





= 1   e ^ : (7)
We estimate (6) using a three-day (l = 2) and a ve-day (l = 4) return announcement window. We
obtain estimates ^   0:031 in both cases, so we use this as our benchmark value.
Next, we estimate the measurement error j. There is strong evidence that rm-volatility varies
both in the time-series and the cross-section, hence it is important to allow j to vary both across
rms and time. For every rm f and year t we estimate its idiosyncratic variance, 2
ft, from daily
returns. This variance is estimated over both announcement and non-announcement days, so it is a
mongrel of both v and . Given the estimate of the daily variance 2, the fraction of trading days
that are announcement days, , and our estimate for the signal-to-noise ratio, ^ , we recover the
measurement error by ft = 2
ft (1 + l)






We then construct our second innovation measure as:
^ Aj = E[xjjrl
jd]  Sjd 1: (8)
Our second innovation measure (8) explicitly accounts for the fact that a rm's idiosyncratic return
may contain information unrelated to the value of a patent. The conditional value of a patent in
equation (4) is an increasing and convex function of the daily rm return, and thus has a similar
shape as our simple innovation measure (2), up to a scale parameter that depends the the signal to
noise ratio.
3.2 Information in stock-price responses
We now provide evidence that the stock market reaction contains valuable information about the
value of a patent. First, we document that trading volume increases around the days that patents
are granted (or their applications are published).14 Second, we document that the stock market
reaction of a patent is correlated with an independent measure of its ex-post value{the number of
future citations the patent receives.
14Though prices can adjust to new information absent any trading, the fact that stock turnover increases following
a patent grant or publication is consistent with the view that some information is released to the market, and not all
agents share the same beliefs.
11Trading volume
We regress a rm's turnover x (trading volume divided by shares outstanding) on an announcement
day dummy variable Ifd,
xfd+k = a0 + aft + bd + b(k)Ifd + ufd; (9)
controlling for rm-year ft and day of the week bd xed eects. We vary k from  1 to 5.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (9). We nd that there is a statistically
signicant increase in share turnover around the day that the rm is granted a patent (Panel A)
or its application is publicized (Panel B). Volume increases on the day of the announcement, and
remains temporarily higher for the next couple of days. We nd that the total turnover in the rst
three days after the announcement increases by 0.21-0.40%. Given that the daily median turnover
rate is 1.29%, this is an economically signicant increase in trading volume, consistent with the
view that patent issuance conveys important information to the market.
Patent citations
The next step is to explore whether the stock price reaction around the day of the announcement
carries information about the likelihood of the patent receiving citations in the future. We look at
patent citations because they represent an independent measure of the ex post value of a patent.
We examine whether the rm's stock price reaction when granted patent j is correlated with
the number of future citations, Cj, the patent subsequently receives:
Cj = a + bAj + y +  logj + ej: (10)
We include grant-year (or publication-year) xed eects (y) in the regression because older patents
have had more time to accumulate citations. We include the rm's idiosyncratic volatility  to
control for the truncation-induced bias in our simple measure measure A+. We consider both
three-day (l = 2) and ve-day (l = 4) announcement day windows. We cluster the standard errors
by year.
We show the estimation results in Table 5. Our truncated measure A+ is informative about the
number of future citations. As we see in Panel A, the coecient of patent citations on our innovation
measure is statistically signicant across patent length windows. The economic magnitudes are
moderately signicant. The median number of citations a patent receives is 5. An increase from
the median to the 90th percentile in terms of stock price reaction around the day the patent is
12granted (its application is publicized) is associated with 0.3 (0.2) more citations. The magnitudes
are substantially larger when we use our measure adjusted for measurement error, as we see in
Panel B. An increase from the median to the 90th percentile in terms of our innovation measure ^ A
is associated with 1.6-1.8 (0.4-0.5) more citations, measured around the patent grant (publication)
day.15
Next, we repeat the exercise, replacing Aj with its logarithm, lnAj. This serves two purposes.
First, it ameliorates the eects of outliers. Second, for our truncated measure A+, it explores
whether the positive eect on citations comes from the transition from zero to positive, or does it
also exist if we focus on the positive responses alone. As we see in Panels C and D, the semilog
specication yields estimates that are economically more signicant. An increase in A+ and ^ A from
the median to the 90th percentile is associated with 1.8-2.1 (0.7) more patent citations, using data
on patent grant (publication) day.
In addition, we perform a number of robustness tests, the results of which are available in the
Online Appendix. First, our ndings are quantitatively similar if we estimate equation (10) with a
Poisson or negative binomial regression. Second, the results using our second idiosyncratic return
measure (the rm's return minus the beta-matched portfolio) are similar, though one-third smaller
in magnitude. Third, we explore what happens if we do not truncate the idiosyncratic dollar return
Aj. We nd that the simple non-truncated dollar return Aj is essentially uncorrelated with future
citations.
The results of this section suggest that the stock price reaction within a few days after the patent
is granted contains important information about the value of the patent. We use this information
to weigh the number of patents when we construct measures of innovation at the rm, industry
or aggregate level. Since the point estimates are a bit higher when we use a three-day versus a
ve-day window, we focus on the former throughout the paper. Finally, the stock price reaction
around both the grant as well as the publication date appear to be informative. Thus, in what
follows, we measure the value of each patent as the sum of the values obtained using the grant-day
and publication-day windows.
3.3 Some illustrative case-studies
Before turning to our main results, we provide some illustrative case studies to highlight the success
of our method in identifying valuable patents. For these examples we performed an extensive search
15Note that small changes in citations generated by a patent (around the median number) can be associated with
large value implications for the rm producing the patent (Hall et al. (2005)).
13of online and print news sources to conrm that no other news events could account for the return
around the patent dates.
The rst example is patent 4,946,778, titled \Single Polypeptide Chain Binding Molecules",
which was granted to Genex Corporation on August 7, 1990. As shown in panel A of Figure 2,
the stock price increased 67% (in excess of market returns) in the three days following the patent
announcement. Investors clearly believed the patent was valuable, and news of the patent was
reported in the media. For example, on August 8 Business Wire quoted the biotechnology head of
a Washington-based patent law rm as saying \The claims issued to Genex will dominate the whole
industry. Companies wishing to make, use or sell genetically engineered SCA proteins will have to
negotiate with Genex for the rights to do so."
The patent has subsequently proved to be important on other dimensions as well. The research
that developed the patent, Bird, Hardman, Jacobson, Johnson, Kaufman, Lee, Lee, Pope, Riordan,
and Whitlow (1988), was published in Science and has since been cited over 1300 times,16 while the
patent itself has been cited by 775 patents. Genex was acquired in 1991 by another biotechnology
rm, Enzon. News reports at the time indicate that the acquisition was made in particular to give
Enzon access to Genex's protein technology.
Another example from the biotechnology industry is patent 5,585,089, which was granted to
Protein Design Labs on December 17, 1996. The stock rose 22% in the next two days on especially
high trading volume (Panel B of Figure 2). On December 20, the New York Times reported that
the patent \could aect as much as a fourth of all biotechnology drugs currently in clinical trials."
Finally, consider the case of patent 6,317,722 granted to Amazon.com on November 13, 2001
for the \use of electronic shopping carts to generate personal recommendations". When Amazon
led this patent in September 1998, online commerce was in its infancy. Amazon alone has grown
from a market capitalization of approximately $6 billion to over $100 billion today. The importance
of a patent that staked out a claim on a key part of encouraging consumers to buy more { the
now-pervasive \customers also bought suggestions" { was not missed by investors: The stock rose
34% in the two days after the announcement, adding $900 million in market capitalization (see
panel C of Figure 2).
Other patents associated with large returns include an ink jet technology granted to Canon in
1982 (panel D of Figure 2), and a digital storage device granted to Sperry Rand in 1959. These
16Google Scholar citation count.
14examples, and a number of others we carefully investigated indicate that our method of identifying
important patents by looking at stock returns appears to work well.
3.4 Construction of innovation measures
We now explain how we use the stock price reaction of innovating rms to construct measures of
innovation at the rm, industry and aggregate level. In addition, we discuss various properties of
our measures, which together, strongly rearm that these measures are reasonable indicators of
innovative activity.
Firm-level measures of innovation
In most of our analysis, the unit of observation is a year because of the availability of macroeconomic
data. Hence, we need to construct measures of innovation at annual frequencies. We do so by
summing over the stock price reaction across all patents granted, or its application published, to
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ft denote the sets of patents granted and published applications, respectively, to
rm f in year t.
In our rm-level analysis, we scale the dollar value of innovation by the end of year market






Hence, our rm-level innovation measures can be interpreted as the fraction of rm f's value that
can be attributed to innovation in year t. (Replacing market values in the denominator by lagged
market values gives very similar results.)
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics for our measure. As we see, the distribution of our
rm-level measure is rightly skewed, as roughly two-third of the rms do not innovate. Furthermore,
the distribution of our rm-level measures of innovation A+
f and ^ Af has fat tails. In Figure 3 we
plot the log complementary empirical cdf, log(1   F(A)), versus the log innovation measure, logA,
for the top 10 percent of the distribution. The relation is close to linear, with a slope coecient
of approximately  1:9. Hence, the tail behavior of A can be well approximated by a power law.
A simple estimator of a power law exponent (see e.g. Newman (2005)) yields a point estimate of
15 2:75.17 Our ndings are consistent with Harho et al. (1997), who show that the distribution of
patent citations has fat tails.
In addition to some patents being very valuable, our results indicate that a few large rms are
very important for the aggregate rate of innovation in the economy. The identity of these rms
varies by decade. In the 1930s and 1940s, AT&T and GM are responsible for a large share of
innovative activity. In the 1950s and 1960s, du Pont and Kodak take a leading role. In 1970s and
1980s, a large share of innovation takes place in Exxon, GE, 3M and IBM. Finally, in the 1990s and
2000s, \new economy" rms are responsible for a large share of innovation, namely Sun, Oracle,
Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, Dell, and Apple.
Next, we explore how our rm-level measures of innovation are related to rm characteristics, in
particular Tobin's Q, rm size, K, and R&D spending (normalized by assets):
Aft = a0 + a1 logQt 1 + a2 logKt 1 + a3 logRDt 1 + Aft 1 + uit: (13)
We estimate equation 13 using the entire sample of Compustat rms from 1950 to 2010 using a Tobit
model.18 We include industry dummies to account for industry-level time invariant characteristics;
and time dummies to account for changing state of the business cycle as well as changes in patent
law or changes in the eciency and resources of the USPTO (see e.g. Griliches (1989)) during our
sample period. We cluster the errors by rm.
We show the results in Table 6. We nd that rms that are large, have higher Tobin's Q, and have
higher R&D expenditures are more likely to innovate. These ndings are similar to those discussed
in Baumol (2002), Griliches (1990), Scherer (1965) and Scherer (1983) on the characteristics of rms
that have conducted radical innovation and have been responsible for technical change in the U.S.
Aggregate measures of innovation
We construct industry-level and economy-wide measures of innovation by aggregating our rm-level
measures across rms. In particular, we construct dollar measures of innovation, by summing up
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ft]: (14)
17This estimator assumes that A is i.i.d. across rms and across time. After removing rm and time dummies, the
point estimate of the power law exponent is equal to  3:70 and  3:55 for A
+ and ^ A respectively.
18Note that information on R&D expenditure is reliably reported in Compustat only from 1975 onwards. As a
result our sample period for regressions that use R&D stock is restricted to 1975{2010.
16Our dollar measure Av will be mechanically aected by economic forces that aect the level of stock
prices but are likely to be unrelated to innovation, such as changes in discount rates. Hence, as








f2Nt Sft. Thus, our aggregate measure, At, is a value-weighted average of our rm-level
innovation measure, Aft.
We compare our two measures of aggregate innovation with three aggregate measures proposed
in the literature: the log number of total patents granted; the log stock of R&D capital from the
BEA; and the log number of technology books published from Alexopoulos (2011). Some of these
measures show a secular time trend, so we remove a deterministic time-trend from all measures.
We plot these series in Figure 4. Our measures of innovative activity line up well with the
three major waves of technological innovation in the U.S. First, our measures suggest high values
of technological innovation in the 1930s.19 When we dissect our measures we nd that rms that
primarily contribute to technological developments during the thirties are in the automobiles (such
as General Motors) and telecommunication (such as AT&T) sectors. This description ts well with
studies that have examined what sectors and rms led to technological developments and progress
in the 1930s (see Smiley (1994)).
Second, our measures suggest higher innovative activity during 1960s and early 1970s { again a
period commonly recognized as a period of high innovation in the U.S (see Laitner and Stolyarov
(2003)). As has been noted, this was a period that saw development in chemicals, oil and comput-
ing/electronics { the same sectors we nd to be contributing the most to our measure with major
innovators being rms such as IBM, GE, 3M, Exxon, Eastman Kodak, du Pont and Xerox.
Third, developments in computing and telecommunication has brought about the latest wave of
technological progress in the 1990s and 2000s, which coincides with the high values of our measure.
In particular, it is argued that this is a period when innovations in telecommunications and computer
networking spawned a vast computer hardware and software industry and revolutionized the way
many industries operate. We nd that rms that are main contributors to our measure belong to
these sectors with rms such as Sun Microsystems, Oracle, EMC, Dell, Intel, IBM, AT&T, Cisco,
Microsoft and Apple being the leaders of the pack. We next turn to providing rm level evidence
that lends additional support to validity of our measures.
19Field (2003) refers to this period as the \most technologically progressive decade of the century."
17Comparing our aggregate innovation series, we also note four important points. First, our two
aggregate innovation series are very similar to each other, suggesting that the truncation bias in A+
is diversied across rms. Second, our measure displays dierent behavior than the total number
of patents, especially in the beginning and in the end of the sample. The correlation between
log A+ ( ^ A) and the log number of patents is equal to 0:36 (0:42) in levels and 0:16 (0:11) in rst
dierences. Third, our two innovation measures capture similar low-frequency movements to R&D
spending and the number of technology books published in the Library of Congress, in particular
the rise in innovative activity during the 1960s and early 1970s. Finally, our innovation measures
displays substantial high-frequency variability relative to either the stock of R&D or the number of
technology books. Some of this variability comes from variation in the number of patents granted,
but a signicant part comes from changes in the average response of the stock market on these
patent grant dates. In contrast, the stock of R&D capital and the number of technology books
display mostly low-frequency variation.
We end this section by discussing the drivers of time-series variation in our economy-wide
innovation measure. One possibility, in the spirit of the `granularity' hypothesis of Gabaix (2011), is
that the observed time-series variation in aggregate innovation is the result of disproportionately
large idiosyncratic shocks that fail to be diversied away. This view is consistent with our ndings
above that the right tail of our rm-level innovation measure follows a power law. The alternative
hypothesis is that there is an underlying macroeconomic shock that aects the rm-level propensity
to innovate and the distribution of patent outcomes.
To shed some light on this, we decompose the aggregate measure of innovation Av
t into Av1
t , the
dollar value of innovation that is contributed by the top 1% of rms; and Av99
t , the value that is
contributed by the remaining rms. Indeed, our aggregate innovation measure is dominated by a
few large rms. Focusing on the sample of rms with positive innovation Av
ft, the top 1% of rms
in terms of innovation account for an average of 32% of the total dollar value of innovation Av
t. If
aggregate innovation is determined by large idiosyncratic shocks, we would expect innovations in
Av1
t to be uncorrelated with A99
t . Instead, we nd that the sample correlation between lnAv1
t
and lnAv99
t ranges from 75% to 78%, depending on our measure. Thus, the data suggests that a
systematic shock aecting all rms is responsible for a large portion of the time-series variation in
Av.
184 Innovation, productivity and reallocation
Given an economy's stock of productive inputs, to maximize the economy's overall level of production,
resources need to be allocated to the most productive rms and industries.20 Here, we explore this
mechanism in more detail on two broad fronts. First, we document the link between innovation and
productivity. Second, we show that, consistent with economic optimization, productive resources
ow into the innovating rm away from rms that do not innovate. In both of these cases we
perform our analysis within as well as across industries.
4.1 Firm-level evidence
We begin by exploring the productivity and reallocation dynamics subsequent to innovative activity
within an industry. In particular, we examine the response of productivity, Tobin's Q and factor
demand to a rm's own innovation activity, Af, and also to the innovation output of its competitors.
We construct our measure of innovation of a rm's competitors, AIf as the average innovative









We dene industries using 3-digit SIC codes.21 We explore the eect of innovation of a rm and its
competitors on various rm outcome variables, x, by estimating the regression
xft+1 = a0 + a1 Aft + a2 AIft + bZft + t + cI + xft + uft+1: (17)
We include lags of the dependent variable, industry cI and year t dummies, and a vector of controls
Z. We control for rm idiosyncratic volatility, ft, when using our truncated measure A+ because
the magnitude of the truncation bias increases with volatility. We control for rm size, measured as
either physical capital or number of employees, because large rms innovate more. In addition, one
source of concern is that unobservable variables at the rm or industry level jointly drive innovation
outcomes and the outcome variable x. Thus, depending on the specication, we control for rm
productivity, protability, Tobin's Q, and rm and industry stock returns. We present results with
and without these controls, and cluster the standard errors by rm.
20There exists a large literature on the importance of resource allocation for economic growth (see, e.g. Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008); Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Jones (2011); Acemoglu et al. (2011)).
21We obtain quantitatively similar results when we dene industries according to their 4-digit SIC.
19We are interested in the estimates of a1 and a2, which capture the impact of innovation by the
rm and its competitors. A rm's innovative output, Af, is highly skewed so we focus on inter-decile
movements in rm-level innovation to explore the economic magnitude of a1. In addition, the
innovation of other rms can have a positive or a negative eect on a rm's outcome variables. An
increase in the innovative output of competing rms can have a positive eect on the rm because
of knowledge spill-overs. However, innovation of competitors can also have a negative eect due to
business stealing or an increase in factor prices. We should note that the presence of unobserved
variables (the \reection problem") leads to an upward bias in the estimate of externalities, a2 (e.g.,
see Bloom et al. (2010)). For instance, common productivity shocks could impact many rms in
the same industry { thereby creating a positive correlation between innovative activity of a rm's
competitors and a rm's own productivity.
Productivity
First, we examine whether rms that innovate have higher productivity subsequent to innovative
activity. We consider both capital- and labor-productivity (mpkft and mplft), dened as rm output|
total sales plus change in inventories|divided by capital and number of employees, respectively. We
evaluate the relation between subsequent productivity of capital and labor and innovation by a rm
or its competitors by estimating (17) with xft = [logmpkft;logmplft]. Depending on whether we
focus on the productivity of capital or labor, we measure rm size as the stock of physical capital or
number of employees respectively.
We report the results in Panel A of Table 7. We nd a substantial increase in rm-level
productivity subsequent to an innovation. Our estimates of a1 imply that an increase in innovation
by the rm from the 50th to the 90th percentile leads to an 0.6% to 1.5% increase in the productivity
of capital and a 1.7% to 2.1% increase in the productivity of labor. Furthermore, we nd some
evidence that the business-stealing eect dominates, as the estimated coecient a2 are negative and
statistically signicant. In particular, a one-standard deviation increase in the amount of innovation
by the rm's competitors is associated with a 1.5% to 1.9% decline in the productivity of capital
and a 1.5-1.8% decline in the productivity of labor. Our nding that labor productivity increases
following innovation, suggests that during our sample period, innovation is more likely to be labor
augmenting than labor saving on average (see, e.g. Acemoglu (2010)).
Our estimates imply that the business-stealing eect is substantial. However, this nding may
be an artifact of the short-horizon considered in our analysis if the business-stealing eect and
20positive spillovers operate at dierent frequencies. In particular, positive spillovers may aect rms
with a lag, so in the medium-run, the response of productivity may be dierent. To explore this
possibility, we estimate a dynamic version of equation (17) with k-year ahead productivity, xft+k, as
the regressand. We consider horizons of one to ve years k = [1::5]. To conserve space, we present
results with only size, lagged productivity and volatility controls. Including additional controls leads
to quantitatively similar ndings.
As we see in Figure 5, the negative eect of competitor innovation, AIf, on productivity exists
only in the short run. As we increase the horizon k, the estimated coecients a2(k) increase,
becoming zero or positive after 5 years. In contrast, the positive eect of rm innovation on
productivity increases with the horizon k. After 5 years, the response of productivity of capital
is between 37% to 50% higher than on impact. Labor productivity displays a similar, though
quantitatively stronger response. The positive eect of rm innovation on labor productivity
increases with the horizon by 65 percent.
In summary, our ndings are consistent with the view that positive spillovers and business
stealing operate at dierent horizons. In the short-run, rms that do not innovate when their
competitors do experience a drop in their productivity as they fall behind. However, in the medium
run, the innovation of other competitors has either a zero or a positive eect. This positive eect
can arise because competitor innovations benets the rm either directly, for instance through
knowledge spillovers, or indirectly, by spurring future rm innovation.
Tobin's Q
Next, we explore the eect of innovation on the market value of the rm. In particular, the rm's
Tobin's Q should respond positively to a rm's innovation output. The response of Q to the
innovation of the rm's competitors will depend on whether the business-stealing or positive spillover
eects dominate in terms of market value. We estimate equation (17) with xft = [logQft] and
present the results in Panel B of Table 7.
We nd that Tobin's Q responds positively to a rm's own innovation activity. Our estimates of
a1 imply that an increase in innovation by the rm from the 50th to the 90th percentile leads to an
1.5% to 1.6% increase in the rm's Tobin's Q. These magnitudes are in line with those reported
in Hall et al. (2005). In addition, we nd some evidence of positive spillovers. A one standard
deviation increase in the innovation activity of other rms in the industry is associated with a 0.5%
to 0.7% increase in Tobin's Q. However, we must be careful when interpreting this as evidence of
21positive spillovers, given the fact that the coecient a2 is likely to be biased upwards due to the
previously-noted reection problem.
Our ndings here conrm that a rm's innovative activity has an unambiguous positive eect on
the rm's productivity and valuation. Our results regarding the net eect of competitor innovation
on rm value are less conclusive { an issue we plan to revisit in future work.
Reallocation
In this section we explore the reallocation dynamics subsequent to innovation by a rm. In particular,
we explore how our innovation measures are related to reallocation of physical capital and labor.
We focus on the rm's investment and hiring rate. In addition, since adjusting a rm's capital and
labor input often involves upfront costs, we explore the allocation of nancial resources. We focus
on the net nancial inows to the rm, dened as new issuance of equity and debt minus payouts
to stock- and bond-holders.
We estimate equation (17), using rm investment, i, net hiring rate, h, and nancial inows, e,
as outcome variables xft = [ift;hft;eft]. As before, our main estimates of interest are a1 and a2,
which capture the change in factor inputs and nancial inows following innovation by the rm and
its competitors, respectively.
We rst examine how physical capital gets reallocated subsequent to innovation by a rm or by
its competitors. Table 8 shows that subsequent to an innovation by a rm, there is a substantial
increase in its investment rate. In particular, our estimates imply that an increase in innovation by
the rm from the 50th to the 90th percentile leads to an increase in the rm's investment rate by
0.5% to 1%. This increase is statistically but also economically signicant given that the median
rm investment rate is 12% in our sample. Furthermore, we nd evidence that physical capital ows
from rms that do not innovate to rms that do. If the rm does not innovate but is competitors
do, then its investment rate is substantially lower. A one-standard deviation increase in the level of
innovation by the rm's competitors leads to a drop in the rm's investment rate by 0.6-1.6%.
Next, we examine reallocation of labor subsequent to innovation by a rm. Table 9 shows that
subsequent to an innovation by a rm, there is a substantial increase in its employment using either
innovation measure. As before, the economic magnitudes are signicant. Our estimates imply that
an increase in innovation by the rm from the 50th to the 90th percentile leads to increase in
employment of the rm by 0.2% to 0.5%, compared to the median rm-level hiring rate of 2.7%. In
addition, labor declines when a rm does not innovate but its competitors in the same industry do.
22A one-standard deviation increase in the average innovation of the rm's competitors leads to a
reduction of 0.7% to 1.4% in the rm's hiring rate. Our nding that innovating rms increase their
labor demand suggests that innovation is more likely to be labor augmenting, and is consistent with
the ndings of Lentz and Mortensen (2008) for Danish rms.
Last, we examine the reallocation of nancial capital subsequent to innovation by a rm and
present the results in Table 10. Following to an innovation by a rm, there is a substantial increase
in its nancial capital inows. Our estimates imply that an increase in innovation by the rm from
the 50th to the 90th percentile leads to an increase of capital inows to book assets of 0.5% to
0.9%, compared to the median level of zero capital ows. We also nd that rms are more likely
increase payout and decrease new issuance when the rm does not innovate but is competitors do.
In particular, a one-standard deviation increase in the average innovation of the rm's competitors
leads to a reduction of 0.8% to 1.6% in net nancial capital ows to the rm. This negative eect
suggests that rms that fail to innovate in an industry where other rms do, have few investment
opportunities. As a result, these rms increase payout to investors.
In summary, our results in this section suggest that, consistent with economic optimization,
resources are reallocated to innovating rms and away from rms that fail to innovate when their
competitors do. In addition, we nd that relative to their median value, new hiring exhibits a
quantitatively stronger response than capital, both in terms of inow and outow. This increased
reallocation response of labor relative to rm capital within industries is consistent with the view
that capital is more rm-specic than labor.
4.2 Industry-level evidence
So far we have focused on the dynamics of productivity and reallocation within an industry. We now
conduct a similar exercise examining the response of productivity and reallocation of inputs at the
sector level. To do so, we use the KLEMS industry-level output data provided by Dale Jorgenson.
The advantage of this dataset is that it contains information on the quantity and price of capital
and labor inputs at the industry level, which allows us to explore the response of factor prices, in
addition to quantities, in response to innovation.
We focus on three outcome variables. First, we document the dynamic response of capital and
labor productivity, dened as the ratio of the quantity of output to the quantity of capital and labor
services, respectively. Second, we focus on the reallocation of inputs, namely the growth rate in the
quantity of capital and labor services. Third, we focus on the rate of establishment exit. Last, we
23examine the responses of factor prices, in particular the price of capital and labor services used in
industry I, scaled by the consumption deator.
We estimate specications similar to (17), but at the industry level:
xIt+1 = a0 + a1 AIt + a2 AMIt + bZt + t + xIt + uIt+1: (18)
Here, AI is our measure of innovation at the rm-level, and AMI is the average level of innovation
in the economy, excluding industry I constructed in a manner similar to (16). Depending on the
specication, we include a vector of controls, Z, which includes stock return and, in the case of our
truncated measure A+, volatility, as well as lagged values of the dependent variable and time eects
t. In the presence of time dummies t, the interpretation of the coecient a2 is unclear, so we only
include one of the two. We cluster the standard errors by industry.
Productivity
First, we explore the dynamic response of industry productivity to its own innovation AI and the
innovation of the other industries AMI. We are interested in the coecients a1 and a2, which
measure the response of productivity to an industry and economy-wide (excluding the given industry)
innovation shock respectively. The coecient a1 is informative as to whether innovation creates net
value or is a zero-sum game that merely aects the distribution of rents within an industry.
We estimate (18) with k-period ahead productivity as the regressand, xft+1 = [logmpkft+k;logmplft+k].
We consider horizons of one to ve years k = [1::5]. We plot the results in Figure 6. We show results
with only lagged productivity and volatility controls, but results are similar if we also control for
stock returns.
We nd that both labor and capital productivity increase in response to own industry innovation.
A one-standard deviation AI shock is associated with a 2.5% increase in the productivity of capital
and labor, after a period of 5 years. By contrast, capital and labor productivity show no statistically
signicant response to the innovation activity of other industries.
Reallocation and Creative Destruction
Next, we examine the response of capital and labor to an industry innovation shock, as well as to
the innovation of other industries. We estimate equation (18) with the outcome variable equal to
the growth rate in the quantity of capital and labor services xIt = [iIt;hIt]. As before, the main
24estimates of interest in this specication are a1 and a2, which capture the change in the quantity
or price of factor inputs in response to innovation in the industry and the rest of the economy
respectively. We show our results in Panel A of Table 11.
We nd that an increase in the amount of industry innovation increases the quantity of capital
and labor services in the industry, though in some specications the eect is not statistically dierent
from zero. As before, we nd that the response of labor is greater than the response of capital. An
increase in industry innovation is associated with a 0.2% to 0.4% increase in capital services and a
0.3% to 0.7% increase in labor services. These magnitudes are economically signicant, given that
the median growth in capital and labor services equals 3.1% and 0.7% respectively.
Our results suggest that increases in economy-wide innovation lead to cross-industry reallocation
of labor and capital. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in economy-wide reallocation
is associated with a 0.5% to 1.0% drop in the growth of capital services and a 1.4% to 2.2% drop in
the growth of labor services.
We also examine patterns of rm exit at the industry level. If industry innovation spurs creative
destruction, we expect to nd a positive relation between the rate of rm exit and the level of
industry innovation. In contrast, innovation in other industries should have less of an eect on the
decision of rms to exit the industry. We estimate specications similar to (18), but we replace the
outcome variable with the rate of rm exit and examine the response of this variable to own industry
innovation AI and innovation of other industries AIM. We obtain information on establishment
exit rates at the industry level from the US Census tables on Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).
Table 12 presents the results.
Industry innovation is accompanied by an increase in creative destruction. The estimated
coecient a1 is positive and statistically signicant across specications. Innovation accounts for an
economically signicant fraction of the variation in rm exit rates. A one standard deviation increase
in industry innovation is associated with an increase in the rm exit rate by 0.2% to 0.4%, while
the unconditional volatility of exit rates is equal to 2.1%. In contrast, economy-wide innovation
AMI has no statistically signicant eect on rm exit.
Factor prices
Last, we estimate equation (18) with the outcome variable equal to the growth rate of the price of
capital and labor services xIt = [_ pIt; _ wIt], using the KLEMS data by Dale Jorgenson. We show our
results in Panel B of Table 11.
25Our point estimates suggest that the price of capital and labor increase following an increase
in economy-wide innovation. The response of the price of labor is highly statistically signicant,
consistent with the increased mobility of labor. An increase in innovating activity in other industries
increases the outside option of workers, leading to an increase in the equilibrium wage. In contrast,
the response of the price of capital to economy-wide innovation is mostly not statistically dierent
from zero, even though the point estimates are similar. This lack of statistical signicance is
consistent with the view that capital has higher specicity than labor (see e.g. (Hamermesh and
Pfann, 1996; Hall, 2002)).
In contrast, we nd no statistically signicant response of the price of capital or labor services
on the industry's own innovation shock. This nding is somewhat puzzling, especially since industry
innovation raises the productivity of both capital and labor.
4.3 Innovation and long-run growth
The results of the previous two sections imply that innovation is followed by increased productivity
of capital and labor, as well as reallocation of resources towards innovating rms. These ndings
suggest that own innovation should be followed by increased output growth, both at the rm as
well as at the industry level. The response of output to innovation by other rms or industries is
more ambiguous. It depends whether productivity increases in the long run, as well as whether the
patterns of reallocation we document are reversed in the long run. To answer these questions, we
estimate specications at rm and industry level similar to (17) and (18)
logyft+k = a0 + a1 Aft + a2 AIft + bZft + 1 logyft + 2 logyft 1 + et+k; (19)
logyIt+k = a0 + a1 AIt + a2 AMIt + bZIt + 1 logyIt + 2 logyIt 1 + et+k: (20)
We again examine horizons of k = 1 to k = 5 years. We control for volatility (in the case of
our truncated measure A+). In the rm-level regression (19), we also include controls for rm
size (capital), and industry and time xed eects. We cluster the standard errors by rm or
industry, respectively. We plot the estimated coecients a1(k) and a2(k) in Figure 7, along with
90% condence intervals.
We nd that both rm and industry output displays a statistically signicant response to an
own-innovation shock. A rm that experiences an innovation shock from the median to the 90th
percentile experiences a 1.5% increase in output over a period of 5 years. The response of output is
26quantitatively more signicant at the industry level. A one standard deviation shock to industry
innovation is associated with a 5.0% output growth over a period of 5 years. Furthermore, a positive
innovation by other rms, or industries, is associated with a decline in output. Output falls by 2.5%
to 3.5% at the rm level, and by 3.5% to 6.8% at the industry level following innovation by other
rms or industries respectively.
In summary, innovation is associated with substantial increases in output. The results of this
section can also be summarized by examining the relation between industry innovation in the rst
half of the sample (1960{1982) and subsequent output growth in the second half of the sample
(1983{2006). In Figure 8 we plot the industry innovation measure AI averaged over the rst half
of the sample (1960{1982) on the X axis and the corresponding output growth of the industry in
the second half of the sample (1983{2006) on the Y axis. The correlation between the two series
is 41% with a robust t-statistic of 2.6. Industries which experienced high technological innovation
in the rst half of the sample were also the ones whose growth rate was subsequently higher in
the second half of the sample. For example, industries such as Electrical Machinery, Automotive
and Communication, which are in the highest quartile of innovation during the rst half of the
sample, had an annualized growth rate of more than 4% over the second part of the sample. Similar
correlation is found for low-innovative industries such as Textile and Utilities.22
5 Innovation and Aggregate Dynamics
Our results in the previous section suggest that innovation is an important determinant of industry-
level productivity and growth, especially in the medium term. In this section, we analyze the eect
of innovation at the level of the U.S. economy.
22One source of concern with our analysis could be that the relation between innovation and output growth is driven
by spurious omitted variables. To alleviate these concerns we generate exogenous changes in R&D activity across
industries by employing the Bloom et al. (2010) instrument for rm level R&D activity. As discussed in Bloom et al.
(2010), the rm level tax price of R&D can be decomposed into a component that is relatively exogenous since it is
based on solely on federal rules. In unreported tests we use the Bloom et al. (2010) rm level R&D instrument and
construct its industry counterpart by taking the average of this tax price across rms in a given industry. We nd
qualitatively similar results to those reported in the table when we instrument the endogenous innovation variables
(A).
275.1 Total Factor Productivity and Output
Impulse Responses
In this section, we examine the extent to which our innovation measures account for medium-run
uctuations in aggregate productivity and output. We start by exploring the relation between
measures of innovation and quantities of interest using VARs and VECMs. Then, we explore whether
our results are sensitive to the details of the specication or the construction of our innovation
measures. We focus on aggregate productivity and output, with productivity measured using
utilization-adjusted TFP from Basu et al. (2006) and output measured as the real per capita gross
domestic product. Our aggregate innovation measures A+ and ^ A are constructed according to (14)
and (15).
We estimate bivariate VARs of the form Z = [logX;logA]0, where X is our variable of interest
and A is our measure of innovation. We include a deterministic trend, following Alexopoulos
(2011). When exploring the responses to our truncated innovation measure A+, we also include
the cross-sectional average of idiosyncratic volatility   to ensure that our innovation measure does
not pick up movements in rm-level volatility. In addition, we also compute responses using a
vector-error-correction model (VECM). We select the number of cointegrating relations using the
Johansen test, which suggests the presence of one cointegrating relation in all systems. We select
the number of lags using the Akaike-Information Criterion, which advocates a lag length of one to
two years for each of the systems. We compute standard errors by a bootstrap simulation of 500
samples. We plot the impulse-response functions in Figures 9 and 10, along with 90% condence
intervals. We compute impulse responses by ordering the innovation shock A last, so the technology
shock aects the variables of interest only with a lag.
We nd that TFP increases by 0.8% to 2% over 8 years following a one-standard deviation
increase in innovation output. The forecast error variance attributed to our innovation measures
ranges from 17% to 70% at the 8-year horizon, depending on the specication. Our ndings are
comparable to the results in Alexopoulos (2011), but in contrast to Shea (1999) who uses only
information on patents and nds a negative relation.
Aggregate output displays a mild U-shaped response. In the rst two years, the response of
output to a one-standard deviation shock is negative at 0.5% to 0.8% and statistically signicant.
However, in the long-run output increases by a substantial amount: a one-standard deviation
innovation shock results to a net 1.5% to 4% increase in aggregate output after 8 years. The share
of 8-year forecast-error variance attributed to our innovation measures ranges from 7% to 16%.
28Last, we explore whether our measure of innovation contains incremental information to stock
prices. Following Beaudry and Portier (2006), we include the level of the stock market in our VAR,
scaled by the consumption deator and population.23 Doing so, also helps us evaluate the extent to
which our results are driven by variation in the denominator of A (the stock market capitalization).
We order the level of stock prices second, so now Zt = [log(Xt);log(Mt);logt;log(At)]0. Our results
are qualitatively similar in terms of statistical signicance, but the economic magnitudes are smaller.
Productivity and output increase by 0.8 and 2.6% respectively at the peak following a one-standard
deviation innovation shock. However, the innovation shock subsumes to a large extent the ability of
the stock market to predict TFP and output. The response of output to a one-standard deviation
shock in logM is in most cases not statistically signicant beyond the one-year horizon. Furthermore,
the innovation shock accounts for a greater fraction of the variance of productivity (2.6% to 18.9%)
and output (4.0% to 15.7%) relative to the the stock market shock (1.0% to 8.3% and 1.0% to
13.0%, respectively).
Comparison to Patents or R&D expenses
We explore whether our measure of innovation contributes relative to other commonly employed
measures of technological innovation: the stock of R&D capital, and the log number of patents.
We estimate two bivariate VARs for productivity, output and consumption, with the log number
of patents or R&D capital series ordered last. We show the results in Figure 11. The number of
patents has some ability to predict an increase in TFP, but the results are quantitatively weaker.
A one-standard deviation shock to the log number of patents is associated with a 0.4% increase
in TFP, and the patent shock accounts for 13.1% of the forecast error variance. The response of
productivity to the stock of R&D capital is not statistically dierent from zero.
Furthermore, a simple patent count has essentially no ability to predict business cycle variables.
The impulse responses of output and consumption are not statistically signicant. Using the stock
of R&D capital, we obtain qualitatively similar though quantitatively weaker impulse responses.
Output drops in the short run by 0.4%. At the eight-year horizon output displays a statistically
signicant increase of 0.3%. The shock to the R&D capital accounts for 1.7% of the variance forecast
error decompositions of output.
23We depart from Beaudry and Portier (2006) in that we include the level of the CRSP value-weighted rather the
level of the S&P 500 index, since the former includes all stocks traded on the three major exchanges.
29Granger causality
If our measure of innovation indeed represents a fundamental shock, then it should not be predictable
by output or productivity. In addition, we explore whether our measure of innovation is predictable
by other measures of technological growth in the literature, for instance the book-based measures of
Alexopoulos (2011) and the stock of R&D capital.
The top panel of Table 13 shows that output and TFP do not Granger-cause either of our
measures of innovation. In addition, the middle panel of Table 13 shows that our measures of
innovation are distinct from the measures of Alexopoulos (2011), in that neither causes the other. Our
measure is somewhat correlated with the number of patents at 32-43%, but not with R&D spending
(less than 10%). The bottom panel of Table 13 shows that our measure is not Granger-caused by
either the number of patents or R&D spending.
5.2 Consumption
Next, we analyze the impulse response of aggregate consumption to our innovation measures. The
response of consumption is informative about whether our innovation measure is an example of an
embodied or disembodied shock. If technological innovation is a free factor of production, in that it
costlessly aects all rms in the manner of a disembodied shock, we expect that consumption should
increase immediately. Agents anticipating an increase in future consumption would like to increase
their consumption today. In contrast, if innovation is not free, because for instance it is embodied
in new vintages of capital or due to adoption costs, then consumption may only increase in the long
run. In the short run, agents will divert resources away from consumption towards adopting new
innovations.
We analyze the response of real per capita consumption of non-durables and services using VARs
and VECMs, as in Secion 5.1. We plot the impulse-response functions in Figure 12, along with 90%
condence intervals. We nd that consumption displays a U-shaped response to innovation. In the
rst two years consumption displays a statistically signicant drop of 0.5% to 0.7%. Subsequently,
consumption increases, leading to a 0.2% to 0.5% net increase after 8 years. However, the increase
in consumption is not consistently statistically signicant across specications. The innovation
shock accounts for 6% to 8% of the forecast-error variance of consumption growth after 8 years.
The short-run drop in consumption is consistent with the delayed response of output in Section 5.1.
Innovation aects output with a lag, so the positive response of consumption is necessarily delayed.
30However, our nding that consumption drops in the short run, whereas output does not, suggests
that the presence of signicant adoption costs.
5.3 Innovation and Tobin's Q
We conclude our analysis by examining the relationship between our measures of innovation and
Tobin's Q at the aggregate level. The theoretical relation between innovation and Tobin's Q is
ambiguous. If innovation represents an increase in TFP that costlessly aects all rms, then standard
models will imply that Tobin's Q should rise (see, e.g. Hayashi (1982)). However, it is also possible
that innovation renders part of the capital stock obsolete (see e.g. Laitner and Stolyarov (2003))
or a reduction in prots for incumbent rms (e.g. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999); Hobijn and
Jovanovic (2001)). In these cases the relationship between innovation and Tobin's Q is less clear.
We estimate the contemporaneous response of Tobin's Q to our innovation measures
logQt = a + blogAt + cZt + et; (21)
where the vector of controls includes lagged values of Q, our innovation measure A and in the case of
our truncated measure A+ changes in the cross-sectional average of idiosyncratic volatility, log.
We show the results in Panel A of Table 14. We nd that our innovation measure is negatively
correlated with Tobin's Q. This negative correlation is statistically and economically signicant. A
one standard deviation increase in innovation is associated with a 8.1% to 12% contemporaneous
drop in aggregate Tobin's Q. Our ndings echo the stylized facts reported in Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1999), Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003), who argue that
Tobin's Q was too low in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the technological advances taking place.
One source of concern with this analysis is that our aggregate innovation measure A may be
mechanically negatively related to Q due to our choice of scaling by the market capitalization
of all rms S. As a robustness test, we scale our aggregate innovation measure by the market
capitalization of innovating rms, SIt =
P
f2Nt Sft  1Aft>0. On average, only about a third of
rms innovate in our sample. Thus, this alternative normalization ameliorates somewhat the concern
that this nding is mechanical. However, as we show in Panel B of Table 14, we obtain similar
results using this alternative normalization.
316 Conclusion
We explore the role of technological innovation as a source of economic growth by constructing
direct measures of innovation at the rm level. We combine patent data for US rms from 1926 to
2010 with the stock market response to news about patents to identify the economic importance of
each innovation. Our measures allow us to uniquely identify the reallocation and growth dynamics
within- and across industry after bursts of innovative activity.
We document a strong link between innovation and productivity at the rm and industry level.
Furthermore, we nd evidence suggesting that innovation is accompanied by \creative destruction"
in the form of resource reallocation, both within and between sectors. Resources ow to innovating
rms and sectors, away from rms and sectors that do not. There are stronger patterns of reallocation
for labor than for capital, consistent with the view that capital is more specic than labor (Ramey
and Shapiro, 2001).
Technological innovation has a signicant impact on aggregate variables in the medium run.
Our innovation measure is strongly related to aggregate movements in TFP. In addition, aggregate
output shows a delayed positive response, consistent with the presence of short-term adoption costs.
A positive shock to innovation has a U-shaped eect on consumption growth: consumption is lower
in the short-run but increases in the long-run. This is consistent with a reallocation of resources
away from consumption in the short-run towards the implementation of innovation. Finally, we nd
that an increase in innovative activity leads to a fall in aggregate Tobin's Q, consistent with the
models of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003).
Our empirical ndings link medium-run macroeconomic uctuations to a direct measure techno-
logical innovation, consistent with the idea of medium-term cycles of Comin and Gertler (2006).
Furthermore, our ndings make a strong case for innovation as a source of long-run rm growth,
consistent with the equilibrium model of Klette and Kortum (2004).
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Productivity is utilization-adjusted TFP from Basu et al. (2006). Populations is from the U.S. Census Bureau
(http://www.census.gov/popest/national/national.html). Output and consumption are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Output is gross domestic product (NIPA Table Table 1.1.5) divided by the consumption
price index (St Louis Fed, CPIAUCNS). Consumption is consumption of non-durables plus services, deated
by the price index of non-nudrables and services respectively (NIPA Tables 1.1.5, 2.3.4). To get hours worked,
we merge series CEU0500000007 and EEU00500005 from the BLS, times total private employment(BLS,
CEU0500000001) divided by population.
Firm-level data
We dene the investment rate as capital expenditures (Compustat: capx) divided by lagged gross property,
plant and equipment (ppegt); labor hiring as the percentage change in the number of employees (emp);
nancial capital inows as debt issuance plus equity issuance minus payout (Compustat sstk + dltis -
prstkc-dv-dltr) normalized by assets (at); return on assets as operating income (ib) plus depreciation divided
by lagged lagged gross property, plant and equipment; Tobin's Q as the sum of the market value of common
equity (CRSP December market capitalization), the book value of debt (dltt), the book value of preferred
stock (pstkrv), minus the book value of inventories (invt) and deferred taxes (txdb), divided by gross property,
plant and equipment (ppegt); productivity of capital as sales (sale) plus change in inventories (invt) over
gross property, plant and equipment (ppegt); productivity of labor as sales (sale) plus change in inventories
(invt) over number of employees (emp).
Other Data
The industry-level data is from the KLEMS dataset of Dale Jorgenson. We use industry value added (constant
prices) as measure of industry output. The aggregate Tobin's Q is computed using NIPA and FRB Flow of
Funds Data as in Laitner and Stolyarov (2003). Finally, the time series information on R&D expenditure
spending in the US is obtained from the NSF website.
36Tables
Table 1: Number of patents
Data step Number of patents
Total downloaded patents 7,797,506
Granted in 1926 or later 5,988,864
Identied as having an assignee 4,386,506
Matched to CRSP 1,840,636
Of which:
Present in NBER data 1,404,822
New to this paper 435,814
The table provides details on patents in our sample. We begin with all patents downloaded from Google Patents, and
restrict the sample to post-1926. Not all patents have assignees, and among those that do, not all are companies in
CRSP. We are able to match 1,840,636 patents to CRSP rms, of which 435,814 (24%) are new to this study. Further












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 3: Stock turnover around patent announcement days
Event l =  1 l = 0 l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4
A. Patent grant -0.396 0.046 0.082 0.074 0.006 -0.377
(-8.93) (2.55) (5.23) (4.51) (0.23) (-9.12)
B. Patent publication 0.094 0.182 0.283 -0.136 0.015 0.147
(1.65) (3.72) (4.33) (-2.04) (0.27) (2.92)
Table shows the output of the regression of stock return turnover (xt+l = volt=shroutt) on a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if a patent was granted to the rm on day t (Panel A), or the USPTO publicized the grant application of
the rm on day t (Panel B). We include rm-year and day-of-week xed eects. We cluster standard errors by year
and report t-statistics in parenthesis. We restrict the sample to rms that have been granted at least one patent.










Table presents descriptive statistics for our rm-level innovation measures A
+ and ^ A.
40Table 5: Number of future citations and announcement day return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
grant publication grant publication
l = 2 l = 4 l = 2 l = 4 l = 2 l = 4 l = 2 l = 4
A: Dollar returns B: Dollar returns
truncated at zero adj for measurement error
A
+
i 1.117 0.865 0.377 0.267 ^ Ai 14.002 9.902 2.771 1.933
(6.53) (6.28) (2.35) (2.42) (6.74) (6.77) (1.68) (1.66)
Obs. 1842345 1842345 416282 416282 Obs. 1828616 1828616 415254 415254
R2 0.096 0.096 0.079 0.079 R2 0.100 0.099 0.079 0.079
C: Log dollar returns D: Log dollar returns
adj for measurement error
logAi 0.704 0.695 0.252 0.256 log ^ Ai 0.939 0.941 0.297 0.297
(7.11) (6.99) (3.01) (2.93) (7.80) (7.82) (2.76) (2.74)
Obs. 894697 894697 202194 202194 Obs. 1828616 1828616 415254 415254
R2 0.099 0.101 0.083 0.082 R2 0.102 0.102 0.084 0.084
Table shows output of a regressions of number of future citations Ni on the dollar return Ai following the day the
patent is issued to the rm (columns 1-3) or the details of the patent are disclosed by the USPTO (columns 1-3).
We construct the dollar return Ai as the return of the rm minus the return of the market portfolio rfd, times the
rm's market capitalization on the day before the announcement in 1982 USb dollars Sfd 1. We report results for
announcement day d returns only (columns 1 and 4); returns from day d to d + 2 (columns 2 and 5); and returns from
day d   1 to d + 4 (columns 3 and 6). Panel A shows results for dollar returns; Panel B shows results for dollar results
truncated at zero; and Panel C shows results for log dollar returns. We control for announcement-year xed eects
and log rm idiosyncratic volatility (logft). We cluster standard errors by announcement year and report t-statistics
in parenthesis.
41Table 6: Which rms innovate?
A+ ^ A
Af (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnKt 1 0.099 0.106 0.116 0.066 0.062 0.067 0.076 0.035
(42.86) (43.71) (46.79) (39.40) (39.55) (40.40) (43.12) (34.17)
lnQt 1 0.052 0.042 0.029 0.035 0.028 0.020
(19.80) (15.04) (17.79) (19.82) (14.96) (20.11)
lnRDt 1 0.103 0.057 0.068 0.030
(28.53) (25.24) (28.38) (23.07)
Af;t 1 0.665 0.742
(68.24) (88.33)
Observations 141695 141695 65234 65058 141695 141695 65234 65058
pseudo R2 0.476 0.490 0.469 0.653 0.644 0.671 0.739 1.242
Table shows Tobit regressions of rm-level innovation Aft on rm characteristics and lagged competitor innovation
AIt 1. Firm characteristics are log rm size (Kft, gross PPE), log Tobin's Q and log R&D expenditures to book
assets lnRD. All specications include year (T) and industry (I) xed eects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A+
It 1 -0.066 -0.049 -0.057 -0.046 A+
It 0.031 0.030
(-6.68) (-5.03) (-6.35) (-5.12) (2.69) (2.62)
A+
ft 1 0.060 0.091 0.108 0.128 A+
ft 0.095 0.098
(5.77) (8.64) (11.71) (13.73) (7.13) (7.33)
R2 0.844 0.847 0.847 0.850 R2 0.684 0.686
^ AIt -0.087 -0.049 -0.084 -0.056 ^ AIt 0.039 0.048
(-6.27) (-3.56) (-6.72) (-6.47) (2.62) (3.16)
^ Aft 0.053 0.102 0.132 0.163 ^ Aft 0.128 0.114
(3.70) (7.02) (10.41) (12.58) (7.08) (6.32)
R2 0.844 0.847 0.847 0.850 R2 0.684 0.686
Observations 125678 125678 120020 120020 Observations 123540 123540
Fixed Eects I,T I,T I,T I,T Fixed Eects I,T I,T
Controls Controls
(Size, mpk or mpl) Y Y Y Y (Size) Y Y
(Rf, RI, q, ) - Y - Y (R, RI, y=k, ) - Y





is log productivity of capital, labor and Tobin's Q. Depending on the specication, the vector Z of controls includes
lagged values of log Tobin's Q, rm stock return (R), rm volatility (, in the case of our truncated measure A
+
only), industry cI or time t xed eects. We control for lagged rm size (log capital (Columns 1-2,5-6) or number
of employees (Columns 3-4)) and productivity throughout. Standard errors are clustered by rm. All variables are
winsorized by year at the 1% level.
43Table 8: Firm-level reallocation: Investment
it+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A+
It 1 -0.046 -0.046 -0.040 -0.031 -0.027
(-10.35) (-10.45) (-12.10) (-9.78) (-8.49)
A+
ft 1 0.039 0.047 0.042 0.040 0.031
(9.13) (11.02) (13.29) (12.79) (10.14)
R2 0.085 0.093 0.221 0.260 0.273
^ AIt -0.070 -0.059 -0.042 -0.036
(-12.27) (-13.52) (-9.92) (-8.50)
^ Aft 0.040 0.034 0.041 0.039
(7.10) (8.23) (9.96) (9.66)
R2 0.085 0.215 0.257 0.273
Observations 126727 126727 126727 126727 126727
Fixed Eects I,T I,T I,T I,T I,T
(Size - K) Y Y Y Y Y
() - Y Y Y Y
(it 1) - - Y Y Y
(Rf, RI, Q) - - - Y Y
(MPK;E=K) - - - - Y
Table shows output of the regression:
it = a0 + a1 Aft 1 + a2 AIt 1 +  Zft 1 + it 1 + uit:
Here it refers to capital expenditures (Compustat item capx) minus sale of property, plant and equipment (Compustat
item sppe) over lagged capital stock (Compustat ppegt). Depending on the specication, we control for lagged values of
log Tobin's Q, rm size (log capital), sales-to-capital (Y=K), protability (E=A), rm stock return (R), rm volatility
(, in the case of our truncated measure A
+ only), industry (I) or time (T) xed eects, and lagged values of the
dependent variable . Standard errors are clustered by rm. All variables are winsorized by year at the 1% level.
44Table 9: Firm-level reallocation: Labor hiring
ht+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A+
It 1 -0.045 -0.046 -0.046 -0.033 -0.024
(-7.35) (-7.60) (-7.93) (-5.92) (-4.30)
A+
ft 1 0.008 0.016 0.024 0.020 0.017
(1.37) (2.80) (4.41) (3.61) (3.05)
R2 0.039 0.044 0.053 0.086 0.090
^ AIt -0.062 -0.063 -0.040 -0.029
(-7.65) (-8.18) (-5.22) (-3.74)
^ Aft -0.008 0.014 0.020 0.017
(-0.97) (1.83) (2.71) (2.25)
R2 0.039 0.053 0.086 0.090
Observations 119760 119760 119760 119760 119760
Fixed Eects I,T I,T I,T I,T I,T
(Size - H) Y Y Y Y Y
() - Y Y Y Y
(nt 1) - - Y Y Y
(Rf, RI, Q) - - - Y Y
(MPL;ROA) - - - - Y
Table shows output of the regression:
nt = a0 + a1 Aft 1 + a2 AIt 1 +  Zft 1 + it 1 + uit:
Here nt refers to log employment growth (Compustat item emp). Depending on the specication, we control for
lagged values of rm size (log no. of employees), sales-to-employees (Y=N), earnings to assets (ROA), rm stock
return (R), rm volatility (, in the case of our truncated measure A
+ only), industry (I) or time (T) xed eects,
and lagged values of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by rm. All variables are winsorized by
year at the 1% level.
45Table 10: Firm-level reallocation: Financial inows
eft+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A+
It 1 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009
(-1.28) (-1.22) (-1.84) (-0.32) (-2.08)
A+
ft 1 0.043 0.037 0.034 0.025 0.014
(6.80) (5.90) (6.30) (4.56) (2.81)
R2 0.114 0.117 0.155 0.184 0.219
^ AIt -0.017 -0.017 -0.005 -0.018
(-2.32) (-2.68) (-0.82) (-2.86)
^ Aft 0.052 0.046 0.048 0.022
(6.03) (6.25) (6.28) (3.09)
R2 0.114 0.154 0.182 0.219
Observations 126727 126727 126727 126727 126727
Fixed Eects I,T I,T I,T I,T I,T
(Size - K) Y Y Y Y Y
() - Y Y Y Y
(finft 1) - - Y Y Y
(Rf, RI, Q) - - - Y Y
(ROA) - - - - Y
Table shows output of the regression:
finft = a0 + a1 Aft 1 + a2 AIt 1 +  Zft 1 + it 1 + uit:
Here finft refers to the ratio of total nancial inows, dened as debt issuance plus equity issuance minus payout
(Compustat sstk + dltis - prstkc-dv-dltr), over book assets. Depending on the specication, we control for lagged
values of rm size (log capital), log Tobin's Q, earnings to book assets (ROA), rm stock return (R), rm volatility
(, in the case of our truncated measure A
+ only), industry (I) or time (T) xed eects, and lagged values of the
dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by rm. All variables are winsorized by year at the 1% level.
46Table 11: Industry reallocation
xt+1 Quantity of capital services, growth Quantity of labor services
A
+
It 0.018 0.015 0.026 0.022 0.024 0.032 0.031 0.039
(2.02) (1.78) (3.11) (2.49) (1.42) (1.88) (1.82) (2.35)
A
+
MIt -0.112 -0.069 -0.274 -0.207
(-7.21) (-3.72) (-7.56) (-4.60)
R2 0.037 0.098 0.165 0.184 0.051 0.080 0.164 0.186
^ AIt 0.023 0.015 0.032 0.027 0.021 0.036 0.029 0.043
(1.99) (1.39) (2.83) (2.24) (0.94) (1.73) (1.34) (2.09)
^ AMIt -0.153 -0.126 -0.263 -0.239
(-8.77) (-4.31) (-6.35) (-5.49)
R2 0.048 0.094 0.164 0.184 0.033 0.072 0.163 0.183
xt+1 Price of capital services Price of labor services
A
+
It -0.026 -0.019 -0.038 -0.031 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005
(-0.96) (-0.70) (-1.39) (-1.10) (0.78) (1.19) (0.74) (0.75)
A
+
MIt 0.022 0.088 0.099 0.123
(0.36) (1.24) (7.00) (7.03)
R2 0.005 0.030 0.145 0.166 0.082 0.091 0.357 0.361
^ AIt -0.048 -0.029 -0.063 -0.043 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009
(-1.38) (-0.85) (-1.84) (-1.24) (0.74) (0.89) (0.71) (0.94)
^ AMIt 0.110 0.146 0.114 0.118
(1.36) (1.79) (6.30) (6.43)
R2 0.007 0.031 0.146 0.166 0.079 0.081 0.357 0.360
Observations 1395 1395 1395 1395 1395 1395 1395 1395
Controls
(R;) - Y - Y - Y - Y
Time Eects - - Y Y - - Y Y
Table reports results from a regression of the quantity [k;h] and price [p;w] of capital and labor services on the amount
of innovation at the industry level [AI] and on the amount of innovation of all other industries [AMI]. We control for
time eects (T), industry stock return R
I, industry volatility 
I (in the case of our truncated measure A
+ only) and
one lag of the dependent variable. Data is from Dale Jorgenson's 35-sector KLEM, described in Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000). Sample is 1960-2005 and covers 31 industries after excluding the nance, utilities and government enterprises
sector. We report t-statistics in parenthesis, with errors clustered by industry.
47Table 12: Innovation and Firm Exit
xt+1 Rate of establishment exit
A
+
It 0.882 0.881 1.057 0.746





R2 0.502 0.502 0.732 0.763
^ AIt 1.313 1.322 2.227 2.171
(2.14) (2.20) (3.31) (2.94)
^ AMIt -4.691 -4.745
(-1.32) (-1.38)
R2 0.509 0.510 0.732 0.735
Observations 231 231 231 231
Controls
(R;) - Y - Y
Time Eects - - Y Y
Table reports results from a regression of the rate of establishment exit on the amount of innovation at the industry
level [AI] and on the amount of innovation of all other industries [AMI]. We include industry xed eects throughout.
Depending on the specication, we include time eects (T), industry stock return R
I, and industry volatility 
I (in
the case of our truncated measure A
+ only). Data is from the tables of Business Dynamics Statistics at the US
Census, and cover 7 industries, after dropping the nance sector and utilities, over the period 1977 to 2009. Industries
correspond to the one-digit SIC code level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered by
year.
48Table 13: Granger causality tests
Variable
Variable does A does
not Granger not Granger
cause A cause variable
A ^ A A ^ A
Output and productivity
Productivity 0.246 0.634 0.006 0.001
Output 0.523 0.121 0.068 0.848
Technology measures of Alexopoulos (2011)
Bowkers technology books 0.236 0.224 0.131 0.704
Library of Congress new technology books 0.111 0.005 0.615 0.647
Computer software and hardware books 0.386 0.477 0.579 0.245
Computer software, hardware, and network books 0.383 0.484 0.626 0.245
Telecommunications books 0.501 0.962 0.237 0.054
Other technology measures
R&D Spending 0.672 0.988 0.448 0.456
Table features p-values of Granger causality tests, based on a 3-variable VAR [Xt;t;At] with a deterministic trend.
49Table 14: Innovation and Tobin's Q
logQt A. Benchmark Measure B. Alt. Normalization
logA
+
t -0.182 -0.256 -0.218 -0.199 -0.194 -0.143
(-4.88) (-6.14) (-3.91) (-5.09) (-4.89) (-2.66)
R2 0.253 0.373 0.387 0.266 0.297 0.305
log ^ At -0.185 -0.223 -0.196 -0.188
(-3.87) (-4.17) (-3.83) (-3.67)
R2 0.188 0.266 0.186 0.223
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
(logAt 1) - Y Y
(logQt 1) - Y Y
(logt) - - Y
Table shows output of a regression of changes in log Tobin's Q at the rm (Panel A) or aggregate level (B) on our
measure of innovation, controlling for changes in volatility (in the case of our truncated measure A
+ only) and lagged
value of Q and innovation measures. Sample is 1952-2008. Results in Panel A use data from Compustat, include
time-xed eects and standard errors clustered at the rm level. Results in Panel B use data from the ow of funds,
and standard errors are computed using the Newey-West estimator.
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